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Abstract.  
Though the recent literature offers intuitively appealing bases for, and evidence of a linkage 
among religious beliefs, religious participation and economic outcomes, evidence on a 
relationship between religion and trust is mixed. By allowing for an attendance effect, 
disaggregating Protestant denominations, and using a more extensive data set, probit models of 
the General Social Survey (GSS), 1975 through 2000, show that Black Protestants, Pentecostals, 
fundamentalist Protestants, and Catholics, trust others less than individuals who do not claim a 
preference for a particular denomination. For conservative denominations the effect of religion is 
though affiliation not attendance. In contrast, liberal Protestants trust others more and this effect 
is reinforced by attendance. The impact of religion on moderate Protestants is only through 
attendance, as frequency of attendance increases trust of others while the denomination effect is 
insignificant.  
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Trust in Others: Does Religion Matter? 
Until recently economists have tended to either minimize or ignore altogether the potential 
impact of cultural factors on economic efficiency and performance. Within the past few years, 
however, there has been a renewed interest among economists regarding social trust and 
religion and their effect on individual attitudes and economic outcomes. Guiso et al. (2006) 
discuss the problem of causality possibility working in both directions in studies of cultural 
factors and economic outcomes. Their claim is that religion practices evolve only over very long 
time horizons and therefore can be treated as time invariant over an individual’s lifetime. In 
cross-country studies (2003, 2006), they then postulate a link between culture, in which they 
include religious groups, and economic outcomes. Their hypothesis is that culture impacts 
economic preferences (such as labor market participation, trust, thriftiness, and fertility) and, in 
turn, economic outcomes. Likewise Barro and McCleary (2003, 2006) invoke Weber’s argument 
that religious beliefs matter for important economic behavior such as honesty and trust in 
affecting economic performance. In a similar manner, Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005) focus on 
international economic policy issues and argue that that religious affiliation has an important 
impact on an individual’s view of others and therefore impacts attitudes toward trade and 
immigration policy, while Torgler (2006a) finds that religiosity correlates positively with tax 
compliance and (2006b) positively with trust in international organizations such as the United 
Nations. The common theme is that religious beliefs shape attitudes (such as trust) which, in 
turn, impact economic performance. 
Though these authors make an intuitively appealing basis for a linkage between religious 
beliefs, participation, and economic outcomes, a significant relationship between religion and 
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trust is mixed at best. In another cross-country study, Smidt (1999) finds not only a statistically 
significant lower level of social trust in the United States than in Canada (based on means 
comparison), but also a positive correlation between trust and church attendance even while 
controlling for denomination. Additionally he finds that, again based on a comparison of mean 
values, Black Protestants and Evangelical Protestants in the United States are generally less 
trusting than other denominations and mainline Protestants more trusting.  
There are few studies, however, on what exactly might add to or reduce social trust. 
Putnam’s (2000) sweeping survey of the American social landscape is one important exception. 
Putnam’s hypothesis is that there has been a decline in social trust over time because of waning 
voluntary participation in civic, social, and religious networks. Putnam also observes that it has 
been the newer evangelical religious denominations that have experienced growth and that 
these denominations tend to focus community efforts inward rather than outward. He 
concludes that (p. 79) “trends in religious life reinforce rather than counterbalance the ominous 
plunge in social connectedness in the secular community.” Further, as Arrow (2000) and 
Putnam (2000) point out, and Glaeser et al. (1996) demonstrate in their study of social 
interactions and crime, there can be a “dark side” to social capital as social interactions can 
have negative effects as well as positive. For example, social capital may reinforce stratification 
among groups in society. 
Recently economists and sociologist have been interested in the various determinants of 
social trust. The most recent studies of the determinants of social trust in the United States 
include Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Welch et al. (2004) who specifically investigate the 
role of religion. Alesina and La Ferrara use twenty years of General Social Survey (GSS) data, 
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including among other factors, dummy variables for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other 
religions. Regarding the religion controls, they find that (p. 220), “interestingly, these variables 
are totally insignificant.” Welch et al., (2004), focus specifically on the link between religion and 
individual trust. They employ a single year (2000) of National Election Study (NES) data to 
examine the link between an individual’s religious affiliation and attendance and their trust. 
They conclude (p. 336) that “contrary to many social commentators and democratic theorists,” 
conservative Protestant beliefs do not reduce social trust (relative to individuals who do not 
claim a religious affiliation) and attendance does not correlate with social trust.  
In this paper we also focus on the relationship between religious traditions, religious 
participation and social trust in the United States. In particular we hypothesize that religious 
participation generates trust of others, and that religious tradition or affiliation impacts an 
individual’s trust of others, but that there are differential effects on individual trust across 
denominations. Our claim is that fundamentalist denominations are thick-tie networks (along 
the lines of Granovetter 1983) that generate strong in-group trust (or bonding social capital as 
in Putnam 2000) at the expense of others outside of the fundamentalist enclave. In other 
words, there is greater trust of those within the individual’s religious network, but lower trust 
of others in society in general. Liberal Protestant denominations, in contrast, are weak-tie 
networks that generate relatively more outward trust (or bridging social capital). That is, there 
is a greater emphasis on the role of the individual in society as a whole in these networks and, 
therefore, a greater level of trust of others in society in general than that of conservative 
denominations. Hence, participation and religious affiliation may exert reinforcing or offsetting 
effects on an individual’s general or overall level of trust. In this application, “social trust” is the 
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generalized trust of “others” in society. We are unable and do not test interpersonal trust or 
trust of others within specific networks, an extension that also deserves greater attention. 
For comparison purposes, our study is designed to compare and contrast with Alesina and 
La Ferrara and with Welch et al. There are, however, some important differences. Contrasting 
with Alesina and La Ferrara, we extend the GSS data from 1994 to 2000, disaggregate 
Protestant into various logical groupings suggested by the literature and include a measure of 
participation (attendance). We differ from Welch et al. by using the GSS data covering several 
years as opposed to a single year centered on a national election and its potential anomalies. In 
addition to the time dimension, the larger sample gives us an additional advantage in that our 
estimates of average effects of specific grouping of Protestant denominations are based on 
much larger samples.1  In contrast to both studies, we also investigate the time aspect of the 
data set.  
The General Social Survey (GSS), 1975 through 2000, is used to empirically examine the 
propositions given above. The dependent variable of analysis is a standard question on the 
degree of trust of others in general. Based on probit models, our results show that Black 
Protestants, Pentecostals, fundamentalist Protestants, and Catholics, trust others less than 
those individuals who do not claim a preference for a particular religious denomination. For 
these denominations, the dominant effect of religion is through affiliation as there is only weak 
evidence of an attendance effect. In contrast, liberal Protestants trust others more and this 
effect is reinforced by attendance. The impact of religion on moderate Protestants is through 
                                                     
1
 Though Welch et al. do not provide the size of their various groupings of Protestant denominations, we are able 
to estimate their size using the appendix to the paper. It appears that some of the groups, fundamentalist 
Protestants for example, approach 30 individuals in number. Other groupings, of course, are much larger and 
provide reliable estimates for the year of their study.  
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attendance, as frequency of attendance increases trust of others while the denomination effect 
is insignificant. A time-trend is significant and negative, confirming the observations of Putnam 
and others that trust has been declining over time. The interaction of the time-trend with 
religious denominations and with religious attendance, however, is not significant. Hence, 
though membership in various denominations has changed over time, the contribution of 
various denominations and attendance does not appear to have. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief narrative of 
the theories on the determinants of social trust and provides hypotheses on how religion likely 
affects trust of others. Section 3 describes the data and empirical model. Section 4 provides and 
interprets the empirical results, while Section 5 offers a conclusion. 
 
2. Social Trust: Why Might Religion Matter? 
Theories on the determinants of social trust typically focus on either individual demographics 
and experiences, or the cultural and societal environment in which the individual resides. These 
two approaches are typically referred to as Individual Theory and Societal Theory. (See Delhey 
and Newton 2003 for a concise yet comprehensive survey of theories of the determinants of 
social trust.)  
Individual Theories of trust postulate that successful and happy individuals are more 
trusting. In regard to economic success, the notion is that individuals in a tenuous economic 
situation have more to lose if their trust in someone else is violated. In other words, trust is a 
much riskier proposition to the poor. The marginal risk of placing trust in another to the 
successful and secure, however, is much lower. This view is consistent with Putnam’s 
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(2000:138) observation that in virtually all societies the “haves” are more trusting than the 
“have-nots.” In addition, those who have been treated better by others tend to be more 
trusting. In general, therefore, individuals with lower levels of education, lower socioeconomic 
status, minorities, and those who have experienced divorce or separation are less likely to trust 
others.  
According to Societal Theories, the second broad category of trust theories, individuals 
develop trust attitudes when interacting with other individuals in society, and likewise affect 
other individuals’ attitudes. There are three non-mutually exclusive theories under the 
umbrella of societal theory. Voluntary Association Theory maintains that direct interaction with 
others on a sustained basis in voluntary organizations (such as a religion-based organization) 
builds social trust and, therefore, societies with dense and well-formed formal voluntary 
networks will generate relatively higher levels of social trust. Social Networks Theory, in 
contrast, claims that although direct interaction is still important, it is casual and impromptu 
interactions, such as chatting with a neighbor in line at the grocery, with neighbors you 
encounter at the local pub, or ad hoc contacts in informal networks, at work for example, that 
are vital. Another branch of Societal Theory, Community Theory, places importance on the 
characteristics of society itself. According to this approach, individuals who live in societies with 
higher levels of income equality and greater ethnic and racial homogeneity are more trusting. 
As Delhey and Newton stress, none of these theories are mutually exclusive and their 
measurement indicators often overlap. Empirical models, therefore, at the same time may find 
support for many or all of these theories.  
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2.1 Relating and Testing the Social Theories of Trust and Religion  
Participation in a religion is the predominant form of voluntary association in the United States 
and, therefore, one might expect, a priori, that religious participation would be positive and 
significant in empirical models of trust. Otherwise, the voluntary association theories would 
appear suspect. Furthermore, given the diversity of religious denominations in the United 
States, one might also expect that the impact of participation in a religious network on 
individual trust would vary across denominations along the lines of Community Theory. Herein 
lies a dilemma for studying the link between religion and trust: Theoretically there are two 
channels through which participation in a religion may affect trust. On the one hand, voluntary 
association theory would have that it is the frequency of participation in a religion-based 
network leads to an increase in trust. Community Theory, on the other hand, allows for 
different approaches to practicing one’s faith and for those approaches to exert differential 
effects on individual trust. In other words, the religious denomination and its various customs, 
messages, and traditions are an important determinant of trust.  
 
2.2  Outcomes of Religious Participation 
According to Wuthnow (2002), religious participation has long been considered important as a 
“social resource,” being a source of interpersonal networks and interaction, and has been 
shown to be an important determinant of other types of civic involvement.  Smidt (1999) claims 
that religious life serves as an important contributor to civil society, and more specifically, that 
religious beliefs may shape the ways in which individuals view human nature and the extent to 
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which members of one religious community relate to those inside and outside of the 
community.  
 Along this line of reasoning, Coreno (2002:337) argues that “… fundamentalists often 
form small interconnected independent denominations in the hope of protecting a quarantined 
traditionalist culture inside a network of church-based institutions. They nourish these enclave 
communities by separating themselves as much as possible from mainline churches in 
particular and secular culture in general.” (See similar arguments by Ammerman 1991, Marsden 
1991, and Tamney 1992.) Smith (1986) adds that Southern fundamentalist denominations, in 
particular, support a stronger sense of this separatism attitude. 
 In the same literature, it is argued that moderate and liberal Protestants, in contrast, are 
less threatened by secular society and tend to thrive more in a modern world. They are also less 
concerned with biblical inerrancy and tend to treat religious beliefs as more personal and 
private.  Further, moderate or mainline denominations tend to relate more inclusively with 
other denominations and engage more in ecumenical activities.  
 In regard to Catholics, Putnam (1993) argues that the hierarchical structure of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Italy hinders cooperation and trust. Smidt (1999), however, in a 
comparison of the United States and Canada, finds that within the United States, Catholics tend 
to be more trusting of others than evangelical Protestants and less trusting than mainline 
Protestants, but Catholics ranked significantly lower than members of Protestant 
denominations in terms of civic engagement. Welch et al. (2004), in contrast, argue that, at 
least since Vatican II, there is no reason to expect that Catholics would trust any less than 
mainstream Protestants.  They claim that the American Catholic Church is substantially 
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different from the Church in Italy, and that most U.S. Catholic parishes do not maintain a rigid 
boundary against the outside culture. Based on this literature we expect that Catholics would 
fall somewhere between fundamentalist Protestants and moderate Protestants in terms of 
social trust and do not expect a priori any difference between pre-Vatican II Catholics and post-
Vatican II Catholics. 
Hence, a thorough study of the impact of religion in individual trust must allow for: (1) 
affiliation effects, (2) participation effects, and (3) the interaction between affiliation and 
participation. We argue, therefore, that the differing approaches of Pentecostal, 
fundamentalist, moderate, and liberal Protestant denominations will be reflected in differing 
attitudes of trust among Protestant members. More specifically, we hypothesize that 
Pentecostal and fundamentalist denominations are thick-tie networks (along the lines of 
Granovetter 1983) or bonding networks (Putnam 2000) that generate “thick trust” or strong in-
group trust at the expense of “thin trust,” or trust towards “others” outside of the 
fundamentalist enclave. Liberal Protestant denominations, in contrast, are weak-tie or bridging 
networks that generate relatively more outward trust. Hence, members of fundamentalist 
denominations are less likely to trust others than the non-affiliated and members of liberal 
denominations.  
In an empirical study, the foregoing argument implies that aggregating Protestant 
denominations together in a single category (as in Alesina and La Ferrara), might result in the 
differing trust attitudes offsetting each other, leading to an incorrect conclusion that “religion” 
is a statistically insignificant determinant of individual trust. Yet, when considering sub 
groupings of individuals, one must ensure that the sample size of each subgroup is sufficient to 
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yield a reasonable estimate of the “average” attitude of the subgroup. Our use of the GSS data 
while disaggregating the Protestant family of denominations addresses these concerns. 
 
3. Data and Model 
The previous sections motivate the following three testable hypotheses: 
1. Members of conservative Protestant denominations are less likely to trust others, 
compared to the base group of individuals who do not claim a preference for a religious 
denomination. 
2. Religious participation, in general and independent of affiliation, leads to greater trust 
of others. 
3. Based on the claims of Putnam (2000) we should find, in addition, a statistically 
significant decline in trust over time. However, we have no expectations regarding 
whether the contribution of the various Protestant denominations and participation, in 
general, has been stable over time or has also evolved. 
 
3.1 Data 
Our data source is the General Social Survey (GSS) spanning the years 1975 through 2000. It is 
important to note that, because respondents to the GSS are different in each survey, this is 
pooled cross-sectional data, not panel data. Nonetheless, the time aspect of the data gives an 
interesting dimension to examine. That is, is there a general decline in trust as suggested by 
others, and are the contributions of various religious denominations and by religious 
attendance (in general) stable over time? Table 1 summarizes all of the variables and provides 
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all of the specific years included in the empirical model. The dependent variable of the primary 
regression model is the response to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Possible 
responses are; “most people can be trusted,” “can’t be too careful,” “depends,” “don’t know,” 
and “no answer.” Because of the limited nature of the dependent variable, we follow Alesina 
and La Ferrara and code this as a binary model with unity assigned to the first category and zero 
to the remaining categories except for no-answer responses which are treated as missing 
observations.  
[Table 1 About Here] 
Independent variables include demographic variables reflecting individual 
characteristics such as age and age squared (to allow for a non-linear effect of age), the number 
of children the respondent has, dummy variables for married, divorced or separated, female, 
African American, education of twelve years or less and education of sixteen years or more, 
parttime employment and fulltime employment.2 The log of the level of real income is also 
included as is the individual’s response to a question on their general level of happiness.3 The 
happiness variable (Happy) is coded as 3 for the response of “very happy,” 2 for “pretty happy,” 
and 1 for “not too happy.” 
The individual’s response to the question “what is your religious preference?” is 
included, beginning with the major denominations of Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other 
religions. The base group, therefore, is individuals who did not report a preference for a specific 
                                                     
2
 It was not possible to accurately code other ethnic groups, such as Hispanics, in this data set. 
3
 Alesina and La Ferrara include the response to a question as to whether the individual has experienced a trauma 
in the past year. This question, however, was not asked over several years of the GSS survey, resulting in a greatly 
reduced sample size. 
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denomination. The individual’s reported attendance of religious services is also included. This 
variable measures the individual’s reported frequency of attending religious services and ranges 
from “never” to “several times a week.” Note that individuals who do not report a preferred 
religion may still report that they attend religious services (even if only attending at holidays, 
weddings and baptisms). A description of the attendance variable and statistics on the mean 
frequency of attendance across denominations is provided in Table 2. 
[Table 2 About Here] 
3.2 Empirical Model 
The data described above represents our base model which we first compare with Alesina and 
La Ferrara. Because of the limited nature of the dependent variable, a probit model is 
employed. All specifications of the empirical model include controls for the nine Census 
divisions and the year of the survey. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used 
for robust standard errors and the clustering of respondents in metropolitan areas is controlled 
for using the size of the SMA. Listwise deletion is used for missing observations resulting in a 
different number of usable observations for each regression model. Reported coefficients are 
the maximum-likelihood estimates of the marginal effects calculated at the mean. Hence, the 
coefficients reflect the change in the probability given an infinitesimal change in the mean value 
of the independent variable. For dummy variables the marginal change is the discrete change 
from zero to unity. All p-values referenced in the text are for two-tailed tests unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
4. Results 
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Model 1 in Table 3, reports results for the base model, which is provided for comparison 
purposes with the studies referenced earlier. The results indicate that trust rises with age, 
income, education, for those who work part-time, and for individuals who describe themselves 
as happy. Age Squared indicates that the age effect is diminishing with increasing years of age 
with the maximum effect occurring at approximately age 66. In contrast, married individuals 
and individuals who are divorced or separated, females, African Americans, and individuals with 
twelve years or less of education are less likely to trust others (relative to their respective base 
groups). None of the religious denominations are individually significant. However, a test of the 
joint significance of the denomination variables, not examined in either Alesina and La Ferrara 
or Welch et al., yields a Chi-Square statistic of 9.47 (which is significant at the 5 percent level), 
so we may reject the hypothesis of no joint significance and the hypothesis of no difference 
among denominations. This motivates further investigation of the individual and joint 
significance of various subdenominations. 
[Table 3 About Here] 
4.1 Attendance and Subdenominations 
As explained earlier, attendance may, in and of itself, have an important effect as the extent of 
past interaction and expected future interaction in community networks may generate bridging 
trust, even if the individual is not committed to a particular tradition. In addition, various 
Protestant denominations or traditions may well have differential effects on their members. If 
either or both of the effects are indeed important, then the results in Model 1 suffer from 
omitted variable bias. Attendance is therefore added to Model 1 and the results are provided in 
Model 2 of Table 3. The results show that attendance is positive and significant at the one-
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percent level.4 Including this variable also causes: (1) Catholic to become statistically 
significantly negative (p-value of 7 percent) and (2) the Chi-Square statistic of joint significance 
of the four denominations to rise to 10.22 (p-value of 3.69 percent). 
The GSS data also includes a variable that sorts Protestant denominations in 
conservative, moderate, and liberal families based on research conducted by the National 
Opinion Research Center (see Smith 1986, 1990). Model 3 of Table 3 introduces dummy 
variables to separate and control for fundamentalist, moderate and liberal traditions. In 
addition, we follow Coreno (2002) and Welch et al., who argue for a separate classification for 
Black Protestant denominations because of the unique historical experience of black 
denominations, coding all African Americans who claim a preference for a Protestant 
denomination in a separate variable. Note that this variable is slightly different from an 
interaction term between African American and Protestant, as African American Protestants 
are removed from the other Protestant categories to differentiate between black Protestant 
and white Protestant. 
The results of Model 3 indicate that black Protestants and members of fundamentalist 
and Catholic traditions are less likely to trust others – relative to the base group of individuals 
who do not claim a preference for a particular denomination – while liberal Protestant 
traditions are more likely to trust others.5 Members of moderate Protestant traditions are not 
                                                     
4
 Smidt (1999) claims that the relationship between social trust and attendance is curvilineary, as those who attend 
the least and those who attend the most as being less trusting. We included in our regressions: 1. the square of 
attendance, and 2. dummied in each category of positive attendance, yet found no evidence of a non-linear 
relationship. 
5
 As an alternative to the coding of “Black Protestant” described above, we also coded Black Protestant as the 
three historically black denominations of National Baptist Convention in the USA, African Methodist Episcopal, and 
African Methodist Episcopal Zion. The only change in our results was that “Black Protestant was negative and 
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statistically significantly different from the base group. In addition, the Chi-Square statistic on 
the joint significance of the denomination variables rises to 150.23 and both the null hypothesis 
of all the coefficients on the denominations being simultaneously zero.  
Welch et al., contend, and this is arguably the most important contribution of their 
work, that Pentecostal conservative Protestant traditions are distinct from other Protestant 
groupings as they establish the strongest social barriers and are therefore more likely to have a 
strong negative effect on social trust. If Pentecostal members are included in the 
fundamentalist group, as in Model 3, it may well be the source of the negative and significant 
effect. In Model 4, Pentecostals are separated from the other Protestant traditions. To do so, 
we use the denomination profiles of The Association of Religion Data Archives 
(www.thearda.com) at Pennsylvania State University to further sort the GSS data into 
Pentecostal families. Appendix 1 provides the denominations that are included in the 
Pentecostal variable. 
The results of Model 4 show that the Pentecostal variable is indeed negative and 
statistically significant. Further, the inclusion of the additional classification had little impact on 
the sign and significance of the other denominations-except for a slight improvement in the p-
value for Catholics-and little impact on the Chi-Square statistic of joint significance. As reported 
earlier, Welch et al. (2004), assert that Pentecostals are distinct from other Protestants because 
of an additional “individualizing” effect. Model 4 indeed indicates a larger marginal effect for 
Pentecostals (in absolute value) than other denominations. Further hypotheses tests show no 
statistical difference between Black Protestants and Pentecostals. The differences between 
                                                                                                                                                                           
statistically insignificant. This new grouping, however, had significantly fewer observations (266 versus 3,410 in the 
original variable). 
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Pentecostals and fundamentalists and Pentecostals and Catholics, however, are statistically 
significant (p-values of 7.0 percent and 3.8 respectively) as is the difference between 
fundamentalist and Catholic (p-value of 4.2 percent). 
We simulate the change in the probability that an individual chooses that “most people 
can be trusted” under various scenarios using Clarify (Tomz et al. 2001 and King et al. 2000) to 
better communicate the contribution of the different denominations to trust. The process 
followed was to estimate Model 4 of Table 3 and draw 1000 sets of simulated parameters of 
the model. Values are then chosen for the explanatory variables to represent a baseline 
individual. Based on means and most frequent occurrences (see Tables 1 and 2), the baseline 
individual is the mean value for age, number of children, income, happiness, and attendance. 
The individual is also married, female, and white, works fulltime, has between 12 and 16 years 
of education, and lives in census division 5. The midpoint of the sample period, 1988, was 
selected as the year and initially the individual has no preference for a particular religious 
denomination. Next, the probability that the baseline individual believes “most people can be 
trusted” is simulated.  
To show the impact of various denominations on trust, the denomination of the 
baseline individual is changed to a specific denomination and the probability that the individual 
believes “most people can be trusted” is simulated again. (One important note is that for Black 
Protestant, the individual is still coded as white. Otherwise, the simulation would reflect both 
being African American and belonging to a black protestant denomination.) Figure 1 illustrates 
the difference in the probability that the individual of a particular denomination believes “most 
people can be trusted” from the probability of the baseline individual. As seen in Figure 1, being 
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a member of a liberal Protestant denomination increase the probability that an individual trusts 
others while being a Catholic or member of fundamentalist, Pentecostal, or black Protestant 
denomination reduces the probability that an individual trusts others. (Recall that Moderate 
Protestant was not statistically significantly different from those individuals who do not claim a 
preference for a particular denomination.) The figure also clearly shows the differential effect 
on trust of the denominations, with Pentecostal and black Protestant reducing by the most the 
probability that an individual trusts others. 
[Figure 1 Abut Here] 
Models, 2, 3 and 4, therefore, confirm our initial hypotheses, that members of 
conservative (Pentecostal and fundamentalist) Protestant denominations trust others less, 
members of liberal Protestant denominations trust others more, and participation, in general, 
leads to greater trust of others.6 
 
4.2 Interaction Effects  
The importance of the interaction effects is to determine if greater immersion in a particular 
denomination and, therefore, greater interaction with members of the denomination 
reinforces the denomination effect or moderates the denomination effect. Table 4 provides the 
interaction of attendance with the various sub-denomination categories of Model 4 in Table 3. 
Note that after attendance has been interacted with all sub-denomination groupings, the 
                                                     
6
 We also experimented with two additional dependent variables, “Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” and “Would you say that most of the time 
people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” and a single variable that 
combined the three different questions on trust, fairness, and helpfulness together. The variable on fairness and 
the combined variable generated similar results as those presented here while the variable on helpfulness tended 
to show the religious participation variable as less statistically significant. 
 18 
coefficient of attendance itself reflects the impact of attendance on those individuals who do 
not have a preference for any particular denomination. Recall that an individual might not claim 
a preference for any particular denomination yet may or may not attend religious services. The 
coefficient on attendance is statistically insignificant, indicating that increased attendance does 
not affect the group of individuals who do not claim an affiliation.  
[Table 4 About Here] 
The interaction terms are also insignificant for Black Protestants, Pentecostals, 
fundamentalists, Catholics, Jewish, and Other religions. For these denominations, therefore, the 
impact of religion occurs through the denomination effect and the level of attendance does not 
appear to either reinforce or moderate the denomination effect. In contrast, the interaction 
terms are positive and significant for both moderate and liberal Protestant denominations. 
Recall from Table 3 that moderate Protestant was not statistically significantly different from 
individuals with no denominational preference. Hence, the impact on moderate Protestants is 
through attendance only. The interaction for liberal Protestants indicates that greater 
attendance reinforces the positive impact of affiliation on trust, and for this group, there exists 
both a denomination and attendance effect. 
 
4.3 Time Dimensions 
The GSS data allows us to consider potential changes in trust in general, and changes in the 
contribution of affiliation and attendance over time. To begin, we follow Guiso et al. (2003), 
and test for a Vatican II effect on Catholics by creating a dummy variable for those individuals 
born after 1962. This variable is then interacted with the Catholic variable and both variables 
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are included in Model 4. The interaction term is statistically insignificant providing no evidence 
of a Vatican II effect on Catholics’ trust of others. 
 Putnam (2000) claims there is evidence of a downward trend in social trust since the 
1960s. Costa and Kahn (2003), however, find the evidence of a trend in social capital mixed. To 
investigate a trend in our variable on social trust, we drop the controls for individual years and 
include a time trend and its square instead. We do not include these results in Table 3, and 
simply report that the trend was negative and significant at the 1 percent level, but the non-
linear term was not significant. Furthermore, though there was no impact on the sign or 
significance of any of the model variables, there was a slight drop in the pseudo R2.   
The time trend was next interacted with each of the denomination groups in Model 4. 
The only interaction term that was significant was Jewish, which was positive and significant 
with a p-value of 7 percent. The time trend alone, which in this model captures the impact of 
time on individuals who did not have a preference for a given denomination, remained negative 
and statistically significant. Hence, the contribution of the various denominational groupings in 
Model 4, other than Jewish, to trust appears to be robust over time in a statistical sense. 
Finally, the time trend was interacted with attendance to examine if the impact of 
attendance, in general, has changed over time. Because of the nature of this variable, two 
dummy variables were created, one for relatively high attendance and one for relatively low 
attendance, leaving as the base groups those individuals who never attend religious services. 
The high-attendance dummy included individuals that attend religious services at least once a 
week or more and the low-attendance dummy included individuals that attended at least once 
a year but less than once a week or more. The high-attendance and low attendance variables 
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were positive and significant, but their interactions with the time variable were not. Hence, the 
impact of attendance appears to be robust over time as well.7 (All of the results regarding the 
time trend and its interaction are available upon request.) 
This leaves us to consider further Putnam’s (2000) claim that trends in religious 
practices and participation tend to reinforce the decline in social trust rather than 
counterbalance that trend. He makes his point explicit (p. 78) that it is the arguable decline in 
overall participation and the shifting of membership out of more moderate and liberal 
denominations toward more conservative evangelical denominations that renders religion in 
the United States as “less effective now as a foundation for civic engagement and bridging 
social capital.” Though the results given here do not prove this claim, they do imply that the 
contribution of overall religious participation and the different effects of individual 
denominations to social trust are stable over time. We suggest that if religion is indeed less 
effective in generating social trust, it might be due to declining participation and a shift from 
liberal protestant denominations to fundamentalist and Pentecostal denominations and merits 
further investigation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
                                                     
7
 An important difference between the work here and that of Welch et al. (2004) is that Welch et al. use a single 
year, 2000, of National Election Survey data. One could hypothesize that an election cycle might well have an 
impact on individual trust. Hetherington (2004) shows that there has been a general decline in the public’s trust of 
government, while Geer (2006) presents evidence that negative campaigning during an election cycle has a slight 
positive effect, if any at all, on trust of the government. We do not know of any systematic study of the impact of 
an election cycle on trust of other individuals. In Model 4 we dropped the year dummy and added a time trend and 
a dummy for presidential election years. The trend is negative and significant while the election dummy is positive 
and significant. This issue may be worthy of additional research. 
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Recently there has been a renewed interest in the relationship between religion, social trust, 
and economic outcomes. This interest is likely motivated by two factors; the persistent and high 
rate of religious participation in the United States relative to most other advanced economies 
and, that religious participation arguably remains the most important form of voluntary 
participation in the United States. Though recent literature has provided compelling theoretical 
arguments for a relationship between social trust and religion, recent empirical yield mixed 
evidence. In particular, cross-country studies such as Guiso et al. (2003) and Barro and 
McCleary (2003) find an association between religious participation and trust, while studies on 
the United States such as Welch et al. (2004) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find mixed or no 
evidence to support an association.  
In this paper we use GSS data spanning twenty-five years to test the relationship 
between trust and religious participation and affiliation. We hypothesize that greater frequency 
of participation in a religious network leads to an increased trust of others, while affiliation, in 
contrast, may have differential effects. Empirical results show that Pentecostals, 
fundamentalists, Black Protestants, and Catholics are less likely to trust others, while members 
of liberal denominations are more likely to trust others. Hence, the trust attitudes of members 
of conservative and Black Protestant denominations stand in stark contrast to those of 
moderate and liberal denominations. In addition, while controlling for the denomination effect, 
trust is increasing with the frequency that the individual attends religious services. Interaction 
of attendance and denomination, however, indicates frequency of attendance is not significant 
for Black Protestants, Pentecostals, fundamentalists, Catholics, Jewish, and Other Religions. The 
interaction term is significant and positive for Moderate and Liberal Protestants. 
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In general, we find that religion does indeed play an important role in the formation of 
social trust. In addition, there are statistically significant differences among denominations and 
significant attendance effects. In addition, as suggested by Putnam (2000) and others, social 
trust in general has changed over time. Consequently, studies which aggregate sub-
denominations to the major-denomination level and that omit attendance mask important 
affiliation effects of religion and overlook participation effects and studies that focus only on a 
single year of data may not truly reflect the contribution of religion to social trust. Recently 
there has been evidence of increase switching by individuals in the United States among various 
denominations. Survey measures of this phenomenon and its impact on general trust of others, 
currently not available in the GSS, would be an important new direction for future research.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean/Proportion  sd  Minimum  Maximum 
Trust 24615  0.3878  0.4873  0  1 
Age 31309  45.2438  17.5684  18  89 
Married 31400  53.95%  0.4984  0  1 
Female 31408  56.80%  0.4954  0  1 
African American 31408  13.25%  0.3390  0  1 
Education<12 31312  24.00%  0.4271  0  1 
Education>16 31312  9.24%  0.2895  0  1 
Children 31298  1.9288  1.7881  0  8 
log Real Income 28354  2.3065  0.0802  1.83  2.43 
Fulltime 31405  50.20%  0.5000  0  1 
Parttime 31405  10.42%  0.3055  0  1 
Divorced/Separated 31400  15.76%  0.3644  0  1 
Happy 31113  2.2030  0.6275  1  3 
Attendance1 30924  22.0776  23.0224  0  60 
Source: General Social Survey, 1975-2000. Total of 31,408 observations.  Specific years are: 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 
1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. Nine Census divisions are also included. Go to 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf for a map of the regions and divisions.  
1. Attendance is annualized following Putnam (2000, p. 424): never=0, less than once a year=0.5, once a year=1, several times a 
year=6, once a month=12, 2-3 times a month=30, nearly every week=40, every week=52, more than once a week=60. 
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Table 2: Denominations and Attendance1 
Denomination 
  
Proportion of Total 
N=31,408  
Mean Attendance 
 
sd 
Protestant  60.91%  24.39 23.1727 
Black Protestant  10.86%  28.16 21.9273 
  Fundamentalist  23.15%  27.85 24.4467 
   Pentecostal  2.59%  34.18 25.1886 
   Fundamentalist2  20.55%  27.04 24.2352 
  Moderate  13.80%  20.30 22.0654 
  Liberal   12.66%  19.21 21.1686 
Catholic  24.70%  25.08 22.9662 
Jewish  1.99%  10.04 16.0325 
Other Religion  2.26%  18.09 22.3982 
No Preference  9.87%  3.47 11.4589 
1. Attendance is annualized following Putnam (2000, p. 424): never=0, less than once a year=0.5, once a year=1, several times a 
year=6, once a month=12, 2-3 times a month=30, nearly every week=40, every week=52, more than once a week=60. 
2. Fundamentalist with Pentecostals removed.   
See table 1 for summary statistics on the attendance variable. 
 
 27 
Table 3: Model Results 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
    β se     β se     β se     β se 
Age Squared 0.0132*** [0.0013]  0.0130*** [0.0013]  0.0129*** [0.0013]  0.0129*** [0.0013] 
Age Squared -0.0001*** [0.0000]  -0.0001*** [0.0000]  -0.0001*** [0.0000]  -0.0001*** [0.0000] 
Married -0.0270*** [0.0084]  -0.0272*** [0.0084]  -0.0235*** [0.0087]  -0.0232*** [0.0087] 
Female -0.0311*** [0.0074]  -0.0328*** [0.0075]  -0.0348*** [0.0077]  -0.0348*** [0.0077] 
African American -0.2167*** [0.0095]  -0.2216*** [0.0095]  -0.1748*** [0.0198]  -0.1739*** [0.0198] 
Education<12 -0.1768*** [0.0080]  -0.1754*** [0.0080]  -0.1673*** [0.0081]  -0.1668*** [0.0081] 
Education>16 0.1592*** [0.0115]  0.1561*** [0.0115]  0.1495*** [0.0117]  0.1492*** [0.0117] 
Children -0.0029 [0.0023]  -0.0034 [0.0023]  -0.0023 [0.0023]  -0.0023 [0.0023] 
log Real Income 0.4438*** [0.0558]  0.4449*** [0.0565]  0.4077*** [0.0559]  0.4048*** [0.0558] 
Fulltime 0.0117 [0.0092]  0.0123 [0.0094]  0.0128 [0.0094]  0.0127 [0.0094] 
Parttime 0.0515*** [0.0139]  0.0507*** [0.0138]  0.0495*** [0.0140]  0.0492*** [0.0141] 
Divorced/Separated -0.0425*** [0.0116]  -0.0405*** [0.0117]  -0.0385*** [0.0118]  -0.0383*** [0.0118] 
Happy 0.0774*** [0.0051]  0.0756*** [0.0053]  0.0747*** [0.0053]  0.0746*** [0.0053] 
Protestant 0.0048 [0.0121]  -0.0037 [0.0123]       
Black Protestant       -0.0821*** [0.0266]  -0.0881*** [0.0267] 
Fundamentalist       -0.0544*** [0.0129]  -0.0553*** [0.0136] 
Pentecostal          -0.0920*** [0.0218] 
Moderate       0.0167 [0.0135]  0.0116 [0.0138] 
Liberal       0.0629*** [0.0145]  0.0578*** [0.0148] 
Catholic -0.0159 [0.0134]  -0.0247* [0.0135]  -0.0249* [0.0134]  -0.0303** [0.0140] 
Jewish 0.0064 [0.0281]  0.0045 [0.0276]  0.0138 [0.0276]  0.0091 [0.0280] 
Other Religion 0.0289 [0.0221]  0.023 [0.0222]  0.0177 [0.0220]  -0.0062 [0.0193] 
Attendance    0.0005*** [0.0001]  0.0007*** [0.0001]  0.0008*** [0.0001] 
Observations 21935   21719   21582   21582  
Pseudo R-squared 9.66%   9.71%   10.08%   10.09%  
Observed Probability 0.3950   0.3957   0.3951   0.3951  
Predicted Probability 0.3796   0.3801   0.3793   0.3793  
Dependent variable is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people?” Robust standard errors are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed tests. All models include 
year and census division controls and these results are available upon request. 
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Table 4: Interaction Effects 
Variable    Β se  Variable    β se 
Age Squared 0.01291*** [0.00125]  Black Protestant -0.08562*** [0.03108] 
Age Squared -0.00010*** [0.00001]  Black Protestant x Attendance 0.00184 [0.00141] 
Married -0.02338*** [0.00870]  Fundamentalist -0.05708*** [0.01505] 
Female -0.03488*** [0.00767]  Fundamentalist x Attendance 0.00213 [0.00133] 
African American -0.17071*** [0.02022]  Pentecostal -0.09430*** [0.03088] 
Education<12 -0.16658*** [0.00810]  Pentecostal x Attendance 0.00217 [0.00157] 
Education>16 0.14900*** [0.01183]  Moderate -0.00387 [0.01486] 
Children -0.00223 [0.00234]  Moderate x Attendance 0.00277** [0.00138] 
log Real Income 0.40423*** [0.05549]  Liberal 0.04749*** [0.01706] 
Fulltime 0.01292 [0.00947]  Liberal x Attendance 0.00253* [0.00139] 
Parttime 0.04924*** [0.01404]  Catholic -0.03149** [0.01528] 
Divorced/Separated -0.03825*** [0.01184]  Catholic x Attendance 0.00209 [0.00145] 
Happy 0.07455*** [0.00531]  Jewish 0.0099 [0.03137] 
Attendance -0.00144 [0.00135]  Jewish x Attendance 0.00167 [0.00209] 
    Other Religion -0.00778 [0.02673] 
    Other Religion x Attendance 0.00205 [0.00158] 
Observations 21582      
Pseudo R-squared 10.11%       
Observed Probability 0.3951      
Predicted Probability 0.3793      
Dependent variable is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people?” Robust standard errors are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed tests. Model includes year 
and census division controls whose results are available upon request. 
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Figure 1 
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Appendix 1: Denominations in the GSS Reclassified as Pentecostal1 
Assembly of God 
Apostolic Faith 
Church of Christ, Evangelical 
Church of Christ 
Churches of God 
Church of God in Christ 
Church of God in Christ Holiness 
Church of the Living God 
Full Gospel 
Four Square Gospel 
Pentecostal Assembly of God 
Pentecostal Church of God 
Pentecostal 
Pentecostal Holiness, Holiness 
Pentecostal 
United Holiness 
Holiness Church of God 
Charismatic 
Pentecostal Apostolic 
1. See The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) at 
http://www.thearda.com/Denoms/Families/F_94.asp 
 
 
 
